IronWallet App Audit
Public summary · not a certification
IronWallet mobile reviews. Version 1.6.1 (build 776), reviewed March–April 2025.
Read this first
This document is a shortened public account of three earlier reviews of IronWallet. It is not an independent security certification, a penetration-test attestation, or a statement about the app as it exists today.
The reviews covered a specific set of builds from early 2025. Findings were open at the time they were recorded. This summary does not include a retest, and it does not say whether later releases fixed them.
Secrets, request traces, internal file paths, and step-by-step defect data from the original files have been removed.
1. What was reviewed
Review | Who | When | What they looked at |
|---|---|---|---|
iOS binary scan | Stingray Technologies, automated mobile scan, manual mode | 27 March 2025 | IronWallet iOS build iron_wallet-1.6.1. Target iOS 18.1, minimum iOS 16.0. MD5 9b6ff3ec4ef7e2acd112d3cac53ebbeb. |
Android binary scan | Stingray Technologies, automated mobile scan, manual mode | 27 March 2025 | IronWallet Android build of the same version. Target SDK 35, minimum SDK 28. MD5 05744f1bcbd1c4db45f58818739b5a27. |
Engineering review | Surf, Flutter development review. Report version 1.1 | 3 March 2025 – 1 April 2025 (report dated 3 April 2025) | Source archive ironwallet_mobile-deploy-pre-production.zip from 3 March 2025. Architecture, code quality, a basic security pass, documentation, UI, testing, and configuration. |
Engineering reviewer details (Surf)
Company | |
|---|---|
Registered address | 1000 N. West, Suite 1200, Wilmington, DE 19801 |
Entity type | Limited Liability Company, organized under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 6 Del. C. § 18-101 |
Registration number | 6664129 |
EIN | 88-1178003 |
The Surf review states that it is a basic security check from the point of view of Flutter developers, and that it is not a full information-security audit. The Stingray documents are scanner reports. Checklist “pass” rates in those scans are tool output. They are not a PCI DSS, MASVS, or store certification.
2. Result at a glance
Source | Critical | High | Medium | Low | Informational |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
iOS scan, 10 confirmed items | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 3 |
Android scan, 16 confirmed items | 0 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 9 |
No critical findings were reported on either platform. The two high findings were on Android. Both scans marked every listed item as confirmed and new. No item was closed in these reports.
Engineering scores (Surf, 1–10)
These scores judge how the codebase and delivery process were set up. They are not vulnerability counts.
Area | Average score |
|---|---|
Architecture | 6 |
Code quality | 4 |
Basic security | 7 |
Documentation | 2 |
User interface | 7 |
Testing | 2 |
Configuration | 5 |
3. Mobile scan findings
Items that repeated the same embedded configuration value are grouped. Values themselves are not shown.
Android — high
High. Cloud-service credentials were present in the app and were accepted by that service. The scan reported a client configuration key for a Firebase service stored in the application package, and a live request using that key returned a normal service response. Client keys of this kind are often restricted by app identity rather than kept fully secret. Unrestricted use can still allow quota abuse or unintended access to the cloud project.
High. Another app on the device could start a third-party support component inside IronWallet. The scan reported that a customer-support service shipped with the app could be started from outside the app. Impact depends on what that component does with the intents it receives. The report did not mention a theft of wallet keys.
Android and iOS — medium
Medium. Android and iOS. An integration credential was stored in the app’s local database. Both scans reported the same class of partner credential in the on-device database, in a form the scanner could read. On a device the user controls, local app storage is not a substitute for a server-side secret.
Medium. Android. A third-party SDK used a weak password-based key setup. The scan attributed this to the customer-support SDK, not to IronWallet’s own wallet-encryption code: an older hash (PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA1) and a low iteration count (2,000).
Medium. iOS. Network responses could be kept in the app cache on disk. Cached responses can include data that should not remain in a file after the request finishes.
Medium. iOS. The app did not block third-party keyboards on fields that can receive sensitive input. A custom keyboard can see what the user types.
Medium. iOS. Many Keychain items used protection classes that keep data available after the first unlock. The scan listed three variants: available after first unlock, the same limited to this device, and available while the device is unlocked. Items that must stay unavailable when the device is locked need a stricter class.
Low
Low. iOS. Third-party SDK configuration, including a cloud API key, was embedded in the iOS app bundle. The scanner’s own checks against common Google APIs reported that this key was not authorized for those APIs.
Low. Android. The manifest did not set whether app data should be treated as fragile when the user uninstalls the app. Android then uses the platform default. The scan recommended setting the flag on purpose.
Low. Android. The app declared dangerous permissions: camera, notifications, reading and writing external storage, and precise and approximate location. Dangerous permissions are normal when a feature needs them. They still need a clear in-product reason and a prompt the user can refuse.
Informational
Android: exported components that come from support libraries (a Facebook custom-tab activity, Firebase messaging receivers, and an AndroidX profile installer). These are common in apps that use those libraries. Each one still needs a reason to be reachable from outside the app.
Android: one app-defined permission with signature protection, plus ordinary system permissions such as internet, biometrics, NFC, vibration, and network state.
Android and iOS: Firebase and Google client identifiers embedded in the binary or written into local SDK files. Identifiers of this kind are expected inside a client app. They are listed because the scanner treats them as sensitive configuration, not because a wallet seed was found in source code.
4. What the engineering review said about security
Surf’s basic security score was 7 out of 10. The review mapped its checks to the OWASP Mobile Top 10 (2024) and said, in substance, the following. This is a paraphrase, not the original report.
- Secrets in the client. API keys were visible in the project. The reviewers could not inspect CI/CD. They recommended release builds through the normal Flutter release command, with obfuscation, and a build process that does not bake secrets into the app.
- Storage. The project used a widely used secure-storage library. Android was configured with AES-GCM. The PIN was stored in that secure store and encrypted in Dart. On iOS, the reviewers noted that values can reach the Keychain without a separate layer of encryption, and they flagged the way values are written.
- Biometrics. Root and jailbreak checks were present. The app did not invalidate an existing session when the user enrolled new biometric data. The reviewers suggested replacing the biometric library they named.
- Runtime checks. There was no check for a debuggable build and no check that the installed iOS or Android package was intact.
- Dependencies. Direct dependencies were pinned, which avoids surprise upgrades. One HTML-rendering library added a large dependency tree.
- Network. No serious issue was recorded. SSL pinning was not in place. The reviewers said pinning was worth adding if the threat model includes a device with a user-installed certificate.
- Logging. Logging was not centralized, so sensitive values are harder to keep out of logs.
- Deeplinks and SQL. The review did not find unsafe handling of deeplink data, and it did not find a SQL-injection issue.
The same review scored documentation and automated testing at 2 out of 10, and code quality at 4 out of 10. Those scores describe maintainability. They are part of why this package of documents is an engineering review plus a scanner run, not a standalone security certificate.
5. What this summary leaves out
- API keys, partner tokens, project identifiers, and other secret or customer-specific values.
- File paths, request traces, and any sequence of steps that would show how to exercise a finding.
- The Surf work plan, internal task list, code-structure advice, and screenshots.
- Scanner checklist scores for payment, tokenization, and digital-currency schemes. Those percentages are not a compliance opinion, and several of those schemes are outside the product’s stated purpose.
6. How to read this if you ship IronWallet
A fair public statement is: in March and April 2025, IronWallet 1.6.1 had an automated mobile scan on iOS and Android and a separate Flutter engineering review. The scans reported no critical issues, two high issues on Android, and a set of medium issues about local storage, iOS Keychain availability, caching, keyboards, and a third-party SDK. The engineering review recorded a basic security score of 7 out of 10 and weaker scores for tests and documentation.
Before describing any of these items as fixed, publish the version that was retested and who retested it.
Sources, all unpublished originals: Stingray scan report for the iOS build (20 pages, created 3 April 2025), Stingray scan report for the Android build (27 pages, created 3 April 2025), and Surf, “Audit of Flutter-app IronWallet”, report 1.1 (81 pages, 3 April 2025). This summary is an original condensation for public posting. It does not replace those documents and does not grant rights to republish them in full.
Stingray Technologies produced the scan reports. Surf (surf.dev) produced the engineering review. Naming them identifies the source. It is not a claim that either organization has approved this public summary.
Surf (https://surf.dev)
Delaware
1000 N. West, Suite 1200, Wilmington, DE 19801. Limited Liability Company Act, 6 Del. C. § 18-101, registration number 6664129, EIN 88-1178003
New York
77 Madison Avenue, 6th floor, New York, 10022
Washington D.C.
12430 Park Potomac Avenue, Potomac, MD 20854

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